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Supply, Land Quality, and Policy
Abstract
Recent reforms of the EC grain sector justify renewed interest in the supply ^alysis of producer policies that
include a subsidy and a land reduction requirement. Some supply analysis accounts for simultaneous land
control and producer payment (Houck and Ryan, Gallagher). However, econometric methods of supply
analysis have limited usefulness when major policy changes occur (Weaver). Major changes have indeed
occurred in Europe, 1. CAP reform, introducing producer subsidies, low ?? price and set-aside. 2, Transition
from central planning. But land quality is an important dimension of producer's participation decisions
(Brooks et al.). And the implications of producers with marginal land on market supply still require
discussion. The potential for domestic supply distortions and price stability are relevant if trade agreements
include such policies.
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Recent reforms of the EC grain sector justify renewed interest in the supply ^alysis
of producer policies that include a subsidy and a land reduction requirement. Some supply
analysis accounts for simultaneous land control and producer payment (Houck and Ryan,
Gallagher). However, econometric methods of supply analysis have limited usefulness when
major policy changes occur (Weaver). Major changes have indeed occurred in Europe,
1. CAP reform, introducing producer subsidies, low ?? price and set-aside.
2, Transition from central planning.
But land quality is an important dimension of producer's participation decisions (Brooks et
al.). And the implications of producers with marginal land on market supply still require
discussion. The potential for domestic supply distortions and price stability are relevant if
trade agreements include such policies.
The supply analysis of this paper accounts for the subsidy and quota aspects of the
policy when producers have similar implements of production but different land qualities.
The model is static but straightforward in its data requirements. Thus, the circumstances
under which supply will contract/expand and become more or less elastic in comparison to
the market are identified.
Supply in the Free Market
Producers could have similar costs per acre because they use similar machinery,
chemical treatments, and harvesting techniques. However, yield would still vary across
firms due to different land qualities. These assumptions are useful first approximations.
Then profit maximizing firms would enter when revenues equal variable costs. Thus, the
break-even point that defines entry for firm i's land is P Y| = C, where P is the product
price, Yj is the yield for firm i, and C is the cost per acre. Now suppose that farm's yields
are uniformly distributed between an upper limit (y^) and a lower limit (yj). Then the yield
density function is f(y) = 1/ (yu-yi).
The cumulative density function for price that combines the yield distribution and the
land-use decision is the area response function, expressed as a percentage of the total land in
the country:
= [Yu " C/P]/[yu-yi], for Pj<P<Py. The price bounds are defined by the entry points
for the best land, Pj = C/y^, and the poorest land, P^ = C/yj.
Output is the product of acreage and average yield for all the land in production:
Q = F(P) E(y). In turn, the mean yield for the land that is used is
^ U
£00 =/ -^ =I (y.-y) =\ (y.-cih
when the qu^ity distribution of yields is uniform and the yield for the margin^ land unit is
written in terms of the entry price. Then the free market supply response is
Q. =
2
:y»-
2(y.-y^
Participation Decisions
Setaside programs combine elements of a producer subsidy with a restriction on input
use. Specifically, a fixed subsidy, s, is paid on each unit of output but producers must
8|6 9(C
reduce land use from Lj to pLj .
Often, the subsidy and the setaside requirement combine for an incentive to reduce
production. Consider the break even point for a profitable firm. Profits are the same with
participation and full production when [(P+s)-P]yjpLj* = (PypC) (1-p) Lj*, or when area A
equals area D in figure la. Alternatively, the producer will participate and reduce land use
when costs per bushel exceed the market price less a correction for the subsidy: C/yj > P-
sLo/(l-p)].
But high-cost firms, those with low yields, could find that production is profitable
when the firm would have shut down otherwise. The firm will produce with the amount of
land allowed in the program when [(P+s)yj - C]pLj > 0 , or when area A in figure lb is
positive. Equivalently, the market price plus the subsidy must exceed unit costs P + s >
C/yj before production will occur.
Effects on Market Supply
The effects of participation decisions by high and low cost producers can be
determined from the area response function, F(P), that depicts entry. The aggregation
problem is shown in figure 2. If the market price had been P before the program, area
would have been A^ . Afterwards, some high-cost land that would not be profitablewithout
the subsidy, Aj^ - A^ , is used but at reduced amounts that satisfy the setaside requirement.
In contrast, intermediate-cost land, Af - Aj,, is reduced to satisfy the setaside requirement.
Further, some low-cost land, Aj^ remains at full utilization when subsidies are moderate and
set-aside requirements are high.
However, there is a point where all low-cost land is placed in the set-aside program.
This occurs when P, ^ P - s —^ , or when the lower horizontal line in figure 2 falls to
1-D
the entry price, Pj. Beyond this point, high subsidies and moderate setaside requirements
cannot reduce area but can distribute additional income to low-cost producers.
Area and yield response fonctions for participant and non-participants are summarized
below:
Program Decision
(cost range")
non-participant
(C/y, < P^
participant
Area, percent
(O-D of base
\ J
Yield
j ty.^c/pj
(P,<C/y,<P^s) =[F(i'+s)-F(P^]p =i
tasK [Pj,
Combining area and yield components, Q=Aj^Yjj+ApYp, gives the supply response
function:
_ yu-(i-p) (ciP '^'-piCKP*s)f
2<yryi)
Beyond the point where the lowest-cost producers enter the program, this function reduces
to:
/ ^ \2
yl-
2<y,-y,)
A comparison of supply response with and without the program suggests that supply
under the program can be greater or less than the unregulated market supply. Unfortunately,
no general rules of thumb are apparent. Consequently, it is best to continue the discussion
with an example.
An Example
Consider the EC grain sector. Reforms included a reduction in the domestic
intervention price to P = 100 ecu/ton, a producer subsidy of s=45 ecu/ton, and a fifteen
percent setaside requirement: p=0.85. Also, Bureau et al. provide some grain cost
estimates for EC countries. Taking French variable costs (intermediate inputs and labor) at
110 ecu/ton and using average yields from the 1984-6 period (6 mt/ha) gives a cost estimate
at about C = 640 ecu/ha. Average state yields give an idea of yield dispersion; yields for
individual EC countries ranged between Y|= 1.5 for Portugal to Yy=8.0 for Ireland during
the 1988-1990 period.
In this example, the high subsidy and moderate setaside exceed the amount needed to
induce participation by the most efficient producers when the market clears at the
intervention price. The combination of planting allowances and setaside requirements that
just induce the producers with the best land to participate are shown below:
P p/(l-p) s = 20
p/(l-p)
.7 2.333 8.57
.75 3.000 6.66
.8 4.000 5.00.
.85 5.666 3.53
.9 9 2.22
.95 19 1.0
These restrictions were developed from the condition:
P = P - s ^• " i-p'
given that p=100. Further, using the same condition to determine when the best land will
be taken out of the program yields the minimum price p=335 ecu/ton. Thus, the analysis
should use the supply function with Pj, = Pj .
The supply response with the policy is compared to the unregulated market in the
table below. At the intervention price, supply is considerably (60%) higher than the
corresponding free market output. Further, supply distortions continue until prices rise to
nearly 150 ecu/ton.
Qm P
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
Qg
37.0590
40.7268
43.6623
46.0482
48.0136
49.6517
51.0315
52.2045
53.2101
54.0786
54.8340
55.4949
56.0766
0.00000
15.4986
26.5846
34.7870
41.0256
45.8807
49.7331
52.8410
55.3846
57.4927
59.2593
60.7543
62.0308
80.0000
90.0000
100.000
110.000
120.000
130.000
140.000
150.000
160.000
170.000
180.000
190.000
200.000
Conclusion
The role of differing land quality on market supply under typical agricultural policies
has been examined. More general investigations of the micro-level yield distribution or entry
price schedule are clearly possible. But the proposed supply relationships do have modest
data requirements. They may access the potential for supply distortion and price stability
when limited experience with new policies precludes analysis with the usually econometric
methods. Calculations for the EC grain sector suggest that the supply curve has shifted
outward and become more inelastic for most plausible price levels.
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